lundi 14 janvier 2013

'Les Mis', 'Argo', 'Homeland' top Golden Globes winners



MANILA, Philippines - The 70th Golden Globes, one of the biggest events in the Awards Season, just wrapped up at the International Ballroom of the Beverly Hilton Hotel in Beverly Hills on January 13 (January 14, 9am, Manila time).
Tina Fey and Amy Poehler hosted. As predicted, the night was filled with laughs and light moments.
Here is the complete list of winners:
  • Best Supporting Actor: Christoph Waltz, Django Unchained
  • Best Supporting Actress in a Series, Mini-Series or TV Movie: Maggie Smith, Downton Abbey
  • Best Mini-Series or TV Movie: Game Change
  • Best Actress in a Mini-Series or TV Movie: Julianne Moore, Game Change
  • Best Actor in a TV Series - Drama: Damian Lewis, Homeland
  • Best TV Series - Drama: Homeland
  • Best Original Score: Mychael Danna, Life of Pi
  • Original Song (Motion Picture): Skyfall, Adele
  • Best Performance by an Actor for TV Movie / Mini-Series: Kevin Costner, Hatfield and McCoy
  • Best Actress in a Motion Picture - Comedy or Musical: Jennifer Lawrence, Silver Linings Playbook
  • Best Actor in a Mini-Series or TV Movie: Ed Harris, Game Change
  • Best Supporting Actress in a Motion Picture: Anne Hathaway, Les Miserables
  • Best Screenplay - Motion Picture: Quentin Tarantino, Django Unchained
  • Best Actor in a TV Series - Comedy or Musical: Don Cheadle, House of Lies
  • Best Foreign Language Film: Amour (Austria)
  • Best Actress in a TV Series - Drama: Claire Danes, Homeland
  • Best Animated Feature Film: Brave
  • Best Actress in a TV Comedy or Musical: Lena Dunham, Girls
  • Cecile B de Mille Lifetime Achievement awardee: Jodie Foster
  • Best Director: Ben Affleck, Argo
  • Best TV Series - Comedy or Musical: Girls (HBO)
  • Best Actor in a Motion Picture - Comedy or Musical: Hugh Jackman, Les Miserables
  • Best Comedy or Musical: Les Miserables
  • Best Actress in a Motion Picture - Drama: Jessica Chastain, Zero Dark Thirty
  • Best Actor in a Motion Picture - Drama: Daniel Day-Lewis, Lincoln
  • Best Motion Picture - Drama: Argo
rappel.com

lundi 12 novembre 2012

The survival of the Arab monarchies


After The Arab sprint .....
emir of kowait with the king of KSA
Why does monarchy march on while republican dictatorships precariously wobble in the Arab world? The undertow of the Arab Spring reveals how unevenly revolutionary unrest spread throughout the region. While popular uprisings rocked the autocratic republics, not a single ruling monarchy fell. Opposition stood quiet in Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), while Oman and Saudi Arabia saw only isolated agitation. Popular reform movements mobilized in Jordan and Morocco, but they fizzled out. Ongoing protests in Kuwait reflect a longstanding tradition of civic activism and political contestation that far predates the Arab Spring. Only Bahrain experienced new large-scale unrest, but military intervention by the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) ended the troubles.
While many observers point to cultural reasons and institutional machinations as the answers, in reality two hard strategic factors best explain the resilience of royalism: oil and geopolitics.
The most popular explanation is that absolute monarchism resonates with the religious and tribal values of Arab culture, and that therefore enjoys legitimacy. Ethnocentrism aside, this is a circular argument. The absence of revolution cannot mean legitimacy, for by that definition all regimes are legitimate until the day they collapse. If legitimacy means the lack of popular revolt, then many monarchies already fail this litmus test -- either now, as in Bahrain's recent failed uprising, or in the past, as the kingships of Morocco, Jordan, and Oman all suffered violent conflicts in the 1960s or 1970s. Indeed, history is the harshest critic of all. No royal legitimacy safeguarded the monarchies of Egypt, Tunisia, Iraq, North Yemen, Libya, Afghanistan, and Iran from their ignominious overthrow in the latter half of the twentieth century, with some (as in Iran and Iraq) suffering at the hands violent revolutionaries who were all but loyal and submissive.
If not some exotic cultural essence, what about institutional wizardry? Some scholars believe that kings have the unique capacity to halt public anger by imposing liberalizing reforms and engaging public demands. Yet having the institutional means to pacify opposition does not guarantee thedesire to do so. Morocco and Jordan responded to popular mobilization with constitutional reform, but youth activists fared worse in the Gulf kingdoms, whose regimes embrace repression over compromise. Another argument concerns the institutional practice of dynasticism: royal families can stick together and monopolize state resources, thereby ensuring a united front. However, the same unity can also make kings and emirs beholden to powerful hardline relatives, who fear losing status and wealth if reforms become too bold. In recent years, the kings of Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Kuwait have all learned this hard lesson.
Culture and institutions falter because they suggest that something inherent within absolute monarchism explains their survival. In reality, the Arab kingdoms have weathered the revolutionary storm for exogenous reasons -- they happen to float in a sea of hydrocarbon and geopolitical riches, which have allowed them to capture sufficient domestic support and vital international assistance.
Those who doubt the importance of oil wealth in preventing national unrest during the Arab Spring should ask one question: if presidents like Hosni Mubarak or Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali discovered $100 billion in hydrocarbon riches when besieged by the underserved middle-class, would they have exited office so hastily? Since 2011, Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf kingdoms -- and for that matter, non-monarchical Algeria -- have spent hundreds of billions of dollars for programs ranging from cash grants and salary increases to developmental projects and job creation. The logic is simple: well-fed citizens with well-paying jobs do not revolt. Those that do can be effectively branded by regime spinsters as radicals and terrorists.
Some doubters may point to Libya, where Muammar al-Qaddafi lost power despite sitting atop large oil fields. To be sure, leaders must only have these resources, but also expend them wisely by pacifying sectors of potential opposition and mobilizing public support. For this task of coalition-building, monarchies wield no intrinsic advantage. After all, oil-rich kingships in Iraq (1958) and Iran (1979) suffered deposal by committing the same violent repression and corrupt personalism as did the Arab Spring's republican victims. No single regime type has a monopoly on brutality.
Of course, not all Arab monarchies swim in material affluence. Bahrain is fast depleting its oil and gas reserves, and Jordan and Morocco have no hydrocarbon wellsprings at all, resulting in chronic fiscal difficulty. Yet oil wealth has long circulated across Arab borders through aid ties. Months into 2011, wealthy Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE offered a $5 billion jackpot to Morocco and Jordan should they join the GCC, and pledged a $20 billion Gulf fund to aid more modest Bahrain and Oman. These aid packages, much like past assistance from Arab oil donors, mostly comprise fungible grants rather than conditional loans, and so can be spent by recipients just like domestic revenue. For instance, in late 2011 Jordan reduced a multi-billion dollar budget deficit driven by price subsidies, job promises, and security spending with an infusion of Saudi cash alongside its regular foreign aid haul from the United States.
In addition to the oil factor, many Arab monarchies enjoy staunch backing by foreign powers given their geopolitical locale. The United States had no bases in Libya before it intervened, but the Fifth Fleet anchors in Bahrain, whose unending suppression of the opposition still registers negligent protest by Washington. The same relationship holds for the other Gulf states, on whose territory U.S. military and intelligence assets need to operate if they are to monitor Iraq and contain Iran. Likewise, the recent deployment of U.S. troops to Jordan reflects the strategic value of keeping the Hashemite Kingdom stable, as it abuts Israel and borders Syria and Iraq, while France is in little rush to even gently prod Morocco toward democratization after losing its Tunisian client regime.
For autocratic rulers, external assistance such as this lowers the cost of repression by reducing the prospects of international backlash. Unlike Tunisia and Egypt, whose fallen autocrats received mixed Western signals until the end, those Arab leaders residing in the monarchical states have harvested unambiguous support from every global power. Certainly, some dictatorships can continue to plow through opposition even in the face of international resistance, but continuous foreign patronage makes it all the more cheap.
As a last resort, external actors can protect embattled regimes through coercive means, which the Bahraini case exemplifies. The Arab Spring featured two military interventions, but whereas NATO operations helped destroy the Qaddafi regime in Libya, GCC troops with Western complicity did the reverse in Bahrain. Their physical presence enabled the Khalifah monarchy to regain domestic control and liquidate its opposition movement, and ensured the Saudi state that its neighboring island kingdom would remain under rule by an allied Sunni family. To be sure, the fallen Arab republics had also reaped various kinds of Western coercive assistance, as in the $1 billion-plus U.S. arms and training package that Mubarak earned annually. Yet handing over obsolete fighter jets and outdated radar systems is very different than putting foreign boots on the ground: autocrats cannot deploy heavy military weaponry in tight urban spaces without destroying entire city blocks, as the Syrian civil war has shown.
The Bahraini example is telling in another way. In late February 2011, over 100,000 citizens (nearly 20 percent of the country's population) marched against the regime. In proportional terms, this was far greater than the relative handful who mobilized in Tunisia and Egypt. Had Bahrain actually experienced revolution, arguments about the so-called exceptionalism of Arab monarchy would no longer be as vocal. However, the Khalifah dynasty emerged unscathed not because of royal legitimacy or institutional manipulation, but because it used its modest hydrocarbon revenue to deepen support among Sunni groups while exploiting ironclad GCC guarantees of protection to squash the largely Shiite opposition. These external factors can benefit non-monarchical states, and indeed they did. Algeria's oil and gas wealth proved instrumental in providing well-timed public benefits during the Arab Spring, much like Yemen's presidential transition was hastened by Saudi intervention.
In short, the Arab monarchies are exceptional, but not because they are monarchies. They are beneficiaries of geological fortune, geographic providence, and strategic attention by outside powers. Remove these factors -- rob Saudi Arabia of its oil wealth, deprive Jordan of its Western support, denude Bahrain of GCC intervention, remove France from the Moroccan equation -- and the possibility of monarchical downfall is no longer as far-fetched. Inversely, all this being equal, it is difficult to imagine that Egyptian or Tunisian activists would have delayed their dreams of dignity at the command of a King Mubarak or Emir Ben Ali.

jeudi 8 novembre 2012

Desertec: how strong the partners’ will is?

Desertec is the association of 57 partners from 16 countries which defines itself as the world’s biggest solar power. For three years now, Desertec has been working on an agreement to build a 500 Megawatt (MW) solar power plant in Morocco. The plan is to feed power to European countries by underwater cables coming from North Africa especially around the Sahara region where solar power can be harnessed greatly. This Munich based project, will use mirrors to stock the sun’s rays that will produce steam and allow turbines to create energy. The plants are supposed to cover an area of 6,500 square miles and produce 1,064 terawatt hours (TWh) in the Sahara region. However, up till now no concrete work was done because of difficult international negotiations. This incident might threaten to end Desertec initiative because just a month ago Germany retired from this project that was judged to be a loss making solar business. But Desertec Chief executive Pau Van Son keeps his hope high convicted that Spain has a lot to gain from the settlement. This first project is based in Ouarzazate and construction is expected to last for 4 years. It is expected to cost several hundreds of millions of Euros. Which will to boost Morocco’s economy although the country doesn’t really depend on such kind of energy since more conventional ones are still usable? Once built this plant would produce 160 MW of electricity. By 2050, Desertec wishes to incorporate all of North Africa and the Middle East so that Europe can get a fifth of electricity from solar and wind parks. But the political uncertainty in these regions and the high cost the project demands has made it hard for Desertec to attract investors.

mardi 6 novembre 2012

Apple Inc sold 3 million of its new iPads

 Apple Inc sold 3 million of its new iPads in the first three days the tablet computers were available, driving optimism for a strong holiday quarter despite intensifying competition.
Photo: REUTERS/Robert Galbraith
Sales of the 7.9-inch iPad mini and fourth-generation 9.7-inch version, both Wi-Fi only models, were double the first-weekend sales of the Wi-Fi iPad sold in March, Apple said on Monday.

dimanche 4 novembre 2012

Morocco's king keeps strong hand despite reforms



Rabat - Unlike other Arab leaders challenged on the streets early last year, King Mohammed VI swiftly reformed Morocco's constitution, held an election and let an Islamist party lead the government.
 
His response smothered popular ferment, drew plaudits from the West and seemed to set Morocco on a more democratic course, but 20 months on it is unclear how much power has changed hands.

Le Matin, an establishment French-language daily, still devotes its first half dozen pages to the doings of the monarch and his advisers before the elected government gets a mention.

The Islamist prime minister, Abdelillah Benkirane, still has his office in the vast precincts of the royal palace in Rabat.

For now, his Justice and Development Party (PJD), whose success in an October 2011 election brought it into government for the first time, insists political cohabitation is thriving.

"Morocco is an exception in the region," Communication Minister Mustafa el-Khalfi told Reuters. "We have succeeded in developing a third way between revolution and the old system of governance: reforming within stability and unity."

Under the new constitution, King Mohammed, who bases much of his legitimacy on his Islamic credentials as "Commander of the Faithful" and as a descendant of the Prophet Mohammad, keeps control of military, security and religious affairs, while parliament legislates and the government runs the country.

"Key institutions enshrined in the constitution are coming to life," said one Western diplomat of the reforms. "The breadth of debate is changing. People feel part of the process." 


vendredi 2 novembre 2012

Morocco’s Banque Populaire May Open an Office in Washington


Washington/Morocco News Board-- Washington Business Journal reported on its Friday (Nov. 2, 2012) edition that Morocco’s Banque Populaire “has applied with regulators to establish its first U.S. office in the District.” According to the same source, “It’s not clear what [Banque Populaire] plans are for the Washington area or the U.S. market as a whole.”Banque Populaire has branches in several European countries including France and Italy where large Moroccan communities reside.  The Moroccan community in the Washington area is in need of such banking institution to assist with the needs of the ever-growing number of Moroccans moving to the Mid-Atlantic region.

source:www.moroccoboard.com

Morocco will Send Security Experts to Bahrain to Confront “Shiite Expansion”


“Morocco had finally agreed with the Bahrain Kingdom to send retired security officials who have previously worked in security and army careers, to work with special Bahraini security units to confront the challenges the country is facing, especially those related to confronting the “Shiite expansion”,” Moroccan Hespress website reported Friday.
The news website quoted sources as saying that “Morocco has been preoccupied since few weeks in writing down names of retired security and armed forces elements in order to dispatch them to Bahrain, so that they aid its internal security apparatuses in stabilizing security especially after the country was exposed to the danger of “terror” and “Shiite expansion”.”
ArrestThis week, Morocco strongly condemned “the terror attack that the Bahraini Akar region faced, which resulted in the injury of a number of security forces members,” reiterating "its solidarity with the kingdom in its efforts to fight all types of terror and extremism.”
The African country had also “informed the government about Morocco’s support to efforts aimed at strengthening coexistence and stability between the brotherly Bahraini people, in a way that braces pillars of national dialogue and enhances the reformatory and democratic path in the country.”
In this context, Head of the Social and Humanitarian Research Center in Wajda, Dr. Samir Boudinar told Hespress that “Morocco, with its latest stances – its call to join the Gulf Cooperation Council and its royal visit to the Gulf states – has become closer to those countries in the region.”
He considered that “there has been mutual approach on several priority files and cases on various levels between the Moroccan Monarchy and the Monarchies Club in the Gulf,” indicating that “the security aspect is basic in this strategic approach between the Moroccan and Gulf monarchies, especially with the presence of clear sensitivity towards some files like “the Shiites” file.”
Boudinar further pointed out on his phone interview with the Moroccan news website that this is not the first time in which Morocco sends its security experts to Gulf countries, assuring that “dealing with “the Shiite danger” on the security apparatuses level occupies a high profile”.